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THE UNCERTAINTIES OF SECTION 7 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT
RALSTONE R. IRVINE*
Does the Clayton Act forbid one corporation from acquiring and
holding the assets of a competing corporation when those assets are
acquired as a result of an illegal acquisition of stock or are paid for
in the stock of the acquiring corporation?
In his annual report for the year ending June 30, 1927, Assistant
to the Attorney General William J. Donovan, in discussing the en-
forcement of the antitrust laws, recognized that the recent series of
cases entitled Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Company,
272 U. S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct.i75 (r926),had left the answer in some doubt.
He stated that "It is proposed to institute such proceedings as will
result in determining the question as to the power of this Depart-
ment."
Section 7 of the Clayton Act in part provides:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital of another corporation engaged also in com-
merce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substan-
tially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock
is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or
to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or
tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital of two or more
corporations engaged in commerce where the effect of such ac-
quisition, or the use of such stock by the voting or granting of
proxies or otherwise, may be to substantially lessen compe-
tition between such corporations, or any of them, whose stock or
other share capital is so acquired, or to restrain such commerce
in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly
of any line of commerce.'
The correct application of this section to the question involved in
an acquisition of assets is in part dependent upon a knowledge of the
history and purpose of the Clayton Act.
In 1911 the Supreme Court of the United States announced its
decisions in the Standard Oil2 and Tobacco Trust Cases.3 These cases
*Washington, D. C.
'Act of October 15, 1914, 38 Stat. 730, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8835, as
amended May i5, 1916 and May 26, 1920.
2U. S. v Standard Oil Co., 221 U. S. I, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (1910).
3U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6, 3i Sup. Ct. 632 (1910).
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adopted the "rule of reason" as the rule of interpretation under which
the Sherman Act was to be administered. It is the effect of that rule
"that only such contracts and combinations are within the Act as, by
reason of their intent or the inherent natures of the contemplated acts,
prejudice the public interest by unduly restricting competition or unduly
obstructing the course of trade.' 4 But these decisions did not overrule
prior cases. "Indeed, they declared that prior cases, aside from certain
expressions in two of them or asserted implications from them, were
examples of the rule and show its thorough adequacy to prevent
evasions of the policy of the law by resort to any disguise or subter-
fuge of form, or the escape of its provisions by any indirection." 6
Unfortunately, however, in the administrative process of dissolving
these two trusts, the mandates of the Supreme Court were adminis-
tered in such a way as to cause some disapproval. The belief devel-
oped that the Sherman Law had been emasculated.
The National Platform of the Democratic Party, adopted at the
Baltimore Convention in 1912 voiced this feeling in its declaration
that "we regret that the Sherman Antitrust Law has received a
judicial construction depriving it of much of its efficiency, and we
favor the enactment of legislation which will restore to the statute the
strength of which it has been deprived by such interpretation. "7
But of greater importance were the protests of the owners of
moderate sized businesses.8 These men declared that these decisions
made it impossible to tell what could or could not be done under the
Sherman Law. The "rule of reason" was said to be a rule of uncer-
4Thomsen v. Cayser, et al., 243 U. S. 66, 84, 37 Sup. Ct. 353 (1916).
11U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540
(1896). U. S. v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, 19 Sup. Ct.25 (1898).6Thomsen v. Cayser, et al., supra note 4, at 83.
7CAMPAIGN TEXT BOOK OF DEmocRATIc PARTY (1912) 2-6.
80n January 20, 1914, the President of the United States delivered a message
to Congress in which he recommended additional anti-trust legislation. "The
business of the country awaits also, has long awaited and has suffered because it
could not obtain, further, and more explicit legislative definition of the policy
and meaning of the existing anti-trust law. Nothing hampers business like un-
certainty. Nothing daunts or discourages it like the necessity to take chances,
to run the risk of falling under the condemnation of the law before it can make
sure what the law is. Surely we are sufficiently familiar with the actual pro-
cesses and methods of monopoly and of the many hurtful restraints of trade to
make definition possible, at any rate up to the limits of what experience has dis-
closed. These practices, being now abundantly disclosed, can be explicitly
and item by item forbidden by statute in such terms as will practically eliminate
uncertainty, the law itself and the penalty being made equally plain." (PREsi-
DENT WILSON'S STATE PAPERS AND ADDRESSES, at 52.)
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tainty resulting in business chaos. There was a growing desire for
legislation which would definitely and clearly define those specific
business practices which were considered harmful. 9
The Clayton Act was the outgrowth of these two demands-the
one a demand for a more effective antitrust law, and the other a
demand for a definite statement of practices and combinations which
were illegal.
These two forces are now manifesting themselves in two distinct
views of the meaning of Section 7. One group takes the position
that the section should be liberally construed in order to achieve
the purpose of making the antitrust laws more rigorous and effective.
Others insist that the technical form of the transaction is the essence
of what was condemned in the seventh section of the Clayton Act.
This conflict of construction goes to the heart of the statute and is
the fundamental basis for the disagreement and uncertainties ex-
pressed in and resulting from the series of cases entitled Federal
Trade Commission v. Western Meat Company, supra, at 560. There it
appeared that the Thatcher Manufacturing Company had acquired
the stock of four competing corporations. Thereafter a transfer of all
the business and assets of three of these corporations was made to the
Thatcher Company and the corporations acquired were dissolved.
The Federal Trade Commission then issued its complaint. It found
that the acquisition of stock had been in violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act and ordered the company "to cease and desist from the
ownership, operation, management and control of assets, properties,
rights, etc., secured through such ownership." The Supreme Court
gAttorney General Wickersham counseled against such legislation. "I am
strongly of the opinion that the advocacy of amendments of the law which shall
particularize different acts as constituting unlawful restraints of trade or attempts
at monopoly, has its origin, not so much with those who desire the enforcement
of the law, as with those who are anxious to secure a safe means of its evasion.
An enumeration by statute of the different practices which, in and of themselves,
without regard to circumstances of particular cases, should be declared illegal,
will either go too far or not far enough. Whether or not, for example, selling a
commodity in one part of the country at a price lower than that charged in an-
other part of the country should, or should not be enjoined, must depend en-
tirely upon the nature of the case presented, the circumstances under which such
sales are had, the effect upon competition produced thereby, and the extent and
character of the control exercised by the vendor over the trade in which he is
concerned. Experience in those states in which laws have been enacted particu-
larizing as illegal practices employed in accomplishing a restraint on commerce
does not tend to prove that they have strengthened the law or aided its enforce-
ment." ii ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 14.
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of the United States held, however, that the power of the Federal
Trade Commission is
limited by Section i i to an order requiring the guilty person
to cease and desist from such violation, effectually to divest itself
of the stock, and to make no further use of it. The Act has no
application to ownership of a competitor's property and business
obtained prior to any actionbythe Commission, even though this
was brought about through stock unlawfully held. The purpose of
the Act was to prevent continued holding of stock and the peculiar evils
incident thereto. If purchase of property has produced an unlawful
status, a remedy is provided through the courts. ShermanAct, c. 647,
26 Stat. 209; Act to Create a Federal Trade Commission, c. 3I,
Section ii, 38 Stat. 717, 724; Clayton Act, c. 323, Sections 4,
15, 16, 38 Stat. 730, 731, 736, 737; United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6. The Commission is without author-
ity under such circumstances. 10
Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote the dissenting opinion. It was con-
curred in by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. justice
Stone.
It has been suggested that the limitation which this case places
upon the power of the Federal Trade Commission does not bind the
United States, acting through the Attorney General. There are those
who urge that if the assets were acquired as an incident to or as the
result of an illegal acquisition of stock the United States, under the
authority of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, may successfully attack
such acquisition even after the dissolution of the corporation whose
assets were acquired. They make this argument: The Court in
Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Company, supra, has
suggested that there is a remedy under Sections 4, 15, and i6 of the
Clayton Act. Sections 4" and 1612 give private litigants legal and
1°At 561. Italics supplied.
"That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the District in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall
recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee. Act of October 15, 1914, supra note I.
"That any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction
over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the anti-
trust laws, including sections two, three, seven, and eight of this Act, when and
under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened
conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the
rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against
damages for an injunction improvidently granted, and a showing that the danger
of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue.
Supra note i, § 15.
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equitable remedies for violations of the antitrust laws. Section 1513,
however, confers upon the district courts of the United States juris-
diction "to prevent and restrain violations of this act." Jurisdiction
under Section r. must be based upon a violation of the substantive
law expressed in Section 7 of the Clayton Act, for clearly no other
provision of that act applies. The decision therefore must be limited
to the specific facts involved-must be restricted to a mere determina-
tion that Section I 1 14 of the Clayton Act distinctly limits the power
of the Federal Trade Commission to an order requiring the corpora-
tion "to cease and desist from such violations, and divest itself of the
stock held . . ." whereas the United States is bound by no such
limitation. It is therefore urged that the decision intentionally
implies that the jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts is
1 That the several district courts of the United States are hereby invested with
jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this Act, and it shall be the duty
of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts,
under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity
to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of
petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined
or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have been duly
notified of suich petition, the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing
and determination of the case; and pending such petition, and before final decree,
the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition
as shall be deemed just in the premises. Supra note I, § I'.
14.. . Whenever the conunisson or board vested with jurisdiction thereof
shall have reason to believe that any person is violating or has violated any of the
provisions of sections two, three, seven, and eight of this Act, it shall issue and
serve upon such person a complaint stating its charges in that respect, and con-
taining a notice of a hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least
thirty days after the service of said complaint. The person so complained of
shall have the right to appear at the place and time so fixed and show cause why
an order should not be entered by the commission or board requiring such persons
to cease and desist from the violation of the law so charged in said complaint.
Any person may make application, and upon good cause shown may be allowed
by the commission or board to intervene and appear in said proceeding by counsel
or in person. The testimony in any such proceeding shall be reduced to writing
and filed in the office of the commission or board. If upon such hearing the com-
mission or board, as the case may be, shall be of the opinion that any of the pro-
visions of said sections have been or are being violated, it shall make a report in
writing in which it shall state its findings as to the facts, and shall issue and
cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such violations, and divest itself of the stock held or rid itself of the
directors chosen contrary to the provisions of sections seven and eight of this Act,
if any there be, in the manner and within the time fixed by said order. Supra
note I, § ii.
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broad enough to empower them to prevent the retention of assets
acquired as the result of the use of stock.
This view is greatly fortified by dicta appearing in the subsequent
case of Federal Trade Commission v. Eastman Kodak Company.1 In
discussing the holding in the Western Meat Company case, supra, the
opinion of the court, written by Mr. Justice Sanford, declares:
The question here presented is in effect ruled by Federal
Trade Commission v. Western Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554, 561,
563, in which the decisions in Federal Trade Commission v.
Thatcher Mfg Co. (C. C. A.), 5 F. (2d) 615, and Swift & Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A.), 8 F. (2d) 595, that were
relied upon by the Commission in its petition for the writ cer-
tiorari, were reversed by this Court. In that case it was held
that-although the Commission, having been granted specific
authority by Section ii of the Clayton Act to require a cor-
poration that had acquired the stock of a competitive corpo-
ration in violation of law "to cease and desist from such vio-
lations, and divest itself of the stock held", might require the
corporation to divest itself of such stock in a manner preventing
its use for the purpose of securing the competitor's property-
it could not, after the corporation by the use of such stock had
acquired the property of the competitor, require it to divest
itself of the property thus acquired so as to restore the prior
lawful condition. As to this we said, "The Act has no appli-
cation to ownership of a competitor's property and business
obtained prior to any action by the Commission, even though
this was brought about through stock unlawfully held. The
purpose of the Act was to prevent continued holding of stock and
the peculiar evils incident thereto. If purchase of property
has produced an unlawful status a remedy is provided through
the courts." And they "must administer whatever remedy there
may be in such situation." Distinct reference was there made (p.
561) to Section 15 of the Clayton Act, where express provision is
made for the invocation of judicial remedies as need therefor may
arise.15
Again the specific reference to Section 15 suggests that for a viola-
tion of Section 7 the United States might "after the corporation by the
use of such stock had acquired the property of the competitor, require
it to divest itself of the property thus acquired so as to restore the
prior lawful condition."
In the previous Western Meat Company case Mr. Justice Stone had
concurred in the dissenting opinion. The dissent rested upon a
fundamental difference of opinion as to the meaning of Section 7 and
14a274 U. S. 619, 47 Sup. Ct. 688 (1927).
'
5Federal Trade Commission v. Eastman Kodak Co., supra note i4a, at 624.
Italics supplied.
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was not limited to a mere disagreement as to the powers specifically
conferred upon the Federal Trade Commission by Section i i. It was
there declared that "the purpose of Section 7 of the Clayton Act was
not, as stated by the Court, merely to 'prevent continued holding of
the stock and the peculiar evils incident thereto.' It was also to pre-
vent the peculiar evils resulting therefrom."1" However, in the dis-
senting opinion in the Eastman Case, supra, Mr. Justice Stone
discusses and perhaps limits the meaning of the decision of the major-
ity in the prior case. In contrasting the broad powers conferred upon
the Federal Trade Commission by Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act 17 with those conferred by Section ii of the Clayton
Act he states:
The powers thus broadly given sharply contrast with the
specific enumeration of Sections 7 and ii of the Clayton Act.
As was pointed out in the Western Meat Co. case, the Clayton
Act prohibits only the acquisition of stock and not the assets
of the competing corporation, and in terms merely authorizes
an order requiring the corporation "to cease and desist from
such violations, and divest itself of the stock held. . . . For
that reason alone the majority of the Court thought that the
language of these provisions was not broad enough to enable
the Commission to order the corporation to divest itself of the
physical assets thus acquired, although their acquisition aggra-
vated and brought to its final consummation the very evil aimed
at by the statute.'
This language may indicate that the Court in the Western Meat
Company case did not flatly decide that Section 7 was intended "to
prevent continued holding of stock and the peculiar evils incident
thereto." It may mean that the court was discussing not the purpose
of Section 7 but the purpose of Section 7 as that purpose had been
limited and circumscribed by Section ii. If, as stated, the acquisi-
tion of assets is the consummation of the very evil aimed at by Section
7 then it may well be that, under the broad jurisdictional powers
conferred on the district courts by Section 15, such holding of assets
can be enjoined.
Moreover, it may be pointed out that the Clayton Act was intended
to enlarge and support the Sherman Law by reaching restraints of
trade in their incipiency. From this premise one may conclude that
Section 7 was intended to prevent mergers accomplished by the use of
'
6Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554, 563, 47 Sup.
Ct. 175 (1926).
1738 Stat. 717, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) § 8836-a.
'
8Supra note i4a, at 626, 627.
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stock, that Section 7 extends to the very situation discussed by the
court in the Western Meat Company Case, supra.
It is submitted, however, that the better view denies to the United
States the power under the Clayton Act to compel a divestiture of
assets after the corporation whose assets are acquired has been dis-
solved, even though the assets are acquired as the result of an illegal
acquisition of stock.
The legislative history of Section 7 supports this conclusion.
That Section 7 was intended to apply only to acquisitions of stock
is indicated by the fact that several amendments were introduced in
Congress which would have made the section specifically applicable
to other methods of control and all of these suggestions were rejected
by Congress.19
Perhaps the chief evil at which the Section was aimed was the
"bogus independent." "Bogus independents" had been employed
by a large number of organizations which prior to the passage of the
Clayton Act had fallen under the condemnation of the Sherman Law.
In these cases the controlled corporation was nominally independent,
but was in fact effectively managed by the trust which held the stock
of the "bogus independent." When the trust could not recoverlost
business in a particular section of the country the "bogus inde-
pendent" would be called into service. The trust would refuse to
recognize it and would inform the trade that its goods were poor and
of a low grade. The price of trust brands would not be lowered but
the "bogus independent" by cutting prices would get the business of
the independent and thus destroy the real competitor of the trust.
In some cases the "bogus independent" might be instructed to make
no calls except upon the customers of the true independent competi-
tors, in others it might be prohibited from selling to customers of the
trust at less than the regular market prices. It is needless to say
that the trust supplied the "bogus independent" with goods and
capital.2 0
19For example Senator Cummins introduced an amendment which provided
in part: "That it shall be unlawful for any corporation to acquire, own, hold or
control either directly or indirectly the whole or any other part of the capital
stock or the share capital or any other means of control or participation in the
control of any other corporation also engaged in commerce..." 51 CONG. REC.
14315 (1914).21Senator Cummins, one of the conferees on the bill, indicates the limits of
the section.
I cannot quite agree with the Senator from Montana. Suppose there
were a hundred corporations engaged in a certain kind of business scattered all
over the United States. I do not believe it would be a violation of the anti-trust
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
But the enactment of Section 7 was probably intended to do more
than condemn the secret acquisition of stock for the purpose of main-
taining a "bogus independent." Indeed, the language used condemns
the holding of stock, regardless of the existence or threat* of bogus
competition. There are three conditions named in the 7th section of
the Clayton Act which render illegal the acquisition of stock. They
are: (I) substantial lessening of competition between the corporations
involved, (2) restraining of trade in any community or section, and
(3) tendency to create a monopoly. In the first instance the test of
illegality is the tendency of the acquisition to lessen competition
between the corporation acquiring the stock and the corporation or
corporations whose stock is acquired. This test is clearly too severe
and unfair, if its sole and only purpose is to prevent and eliminate
the "bogus independent." For a "bogus independent" is used to
restrict competition between the parent company and its true
competitors, and not between the parent company and the "bogus
independent." The existence of competition between the acquired
and acquiring companies throws no light on whether it is intended to
create a "bogus independent." The section seems to have been
aimed at something more than the "bogus independent."
The report submitted by the Committee on the Judiciary indicates
the intention of Congress to supplement the Sherman Antitrust Law.
It stated that:
law for one corporation of the hundred to sell out to another. There would still
remain in all probability, that full and substantial competition which the anti-
trust law requires. I do not think that the anti-trust law condemns every lessening
of competition; otherwise it would have to be construed to mean that one concern
could not under any circumstances buy or absorb another. I think it depends on
circumstances whether such a transaction can lawfully occur or not.
Mr. Walsh: That, of course, is qualified by the clause where the effect is to
substantially lessen competition.
Mr. Cummins: It would lessen competition as between the two, but, of course,
if one had a right under the law to buy out the other it could not be any offense
against the law, as it is now, for one to acquire control of the other. It is just
that case that we want, as I think, to prohibit, so that if a consolidation can
lawfully occur under the anti-trust laws, it shall be an open, public consolidation,
so that everybody can know what is transpiring. . . . I do not believe that is
the proper construction of the anti-trust law; otherwise there could be no sale
of business. I think there can be, but wherever the law permits the sale of the
business, then tt ought to be open and public, and a corporation ought not to acquire
control of a business simply through the purchase of the stock of a company which
continues under its own name, and, so far as the public knows, is independent in its
management. That is what I think this section is intended in the main to prevent.
(Italics the writer's) 51 CONG. REc. 14315-6 (r9x4). For a discussion of the use
of the "bogus independent" see STEVENS, UNFAIR COMPETITION (1917) 28.
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Broadly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints
and monopoly, seeks to prohibit and make unlawful certain
trade practices, which, as a rule, singly and in themselves, are
not covered by the Act of July 2, 189o, or other existing anti-
trust acts, and thus, by making these practices illegal, to arrest
the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their in-
cipiency, before consummation. Among others of these trade
practices which are denounced and made unlawful may be
mentioned discrimination in prices for the purpose of wrong-
fully injuring or destroying the business of competitors; ex-
clusive and tying contracts; holding companies; and interlocking
directorates. (Italics supplied).
And this report conclusively establishes that Section 7, formerly
Section 8, was aimed at the holding company and at all the evils
incident to such a practice, including the evil of the bogus independent.
Section 8 deals with what is commonly known as the "hold-
ing company," which is a common and favorite method of
promoting monopoly. "Holding company" is a term, generally
understood to mean a company that holds the stock of another
company or companies, but as we understood the term a "hold-
ing company" is a company whose primary purpose is to hold
stock of other companies. It has usually issued its own shares
in exchange for those stocks, and is a means of holding under
one control the competing companies whose stocks it has thus
acquired. As thus defined a "holding company" is an abomi-
nation and in our judgment is a mere incorporated form of the
old-fashioned trust. Most of the corporations engaged in inter-
state commerce are organized under the laws of one or the other
of the states. It is right that this should be so, and it is right
that the various states, each of which has the right to exclude
corporations of any other state from its borders, should exhibit
comity to these other states, and that the Federal Government,
which perhaps has the right to exclude corporations of any
state from interstate commerce, should exhibit comity to all
the states.
At common law a corporation had no right to own stock in
another corporation, but from time to time the various states
have by special statutes, permitted it, until now certainly
more than a majority of all the states permit corporate stock-
holding either generally or of certain kinds and under certain
conditions. This legislation in its early operation may have
served a useful, economic purpose. Trade and commerce could
do as well without steam and electricity as without the idea
of the commercial unit which is embodied in the word "corpo-
ration." Hence there are certain corporations which may proper-
ly be interested with individuals other than its own stockholders,
but experience has taught us that the "holding company" as
above described no longer serves any purpose that is helpful to
either business or the community at large when it is operated
purely as a "holding company." Section 8 is intended to elim-
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inate this evil so far as it is possible to do so, making such ex-
ceptions from the law as seem to be wise, which exceptions
have been found necessary by business experience and con-
ditions, and the exceptions herein made are those which are
not deemed monopolistic and do not tend to restrain trade.2 1
But however interesting an examination of the history of the Act
may be, it is probable that the statute will be interpreted without
resort to the debates and the committee reports. The Supreme Court
of the United States has already indicated its belief that "the words of
the Act are plain and the meaning is apparent without res6rt to the
extraneous statement and often unsatisfactory aid of such reports. '22
Section 7 in terms condemns the acquisition of stock. It does not
mention assets. And the history of the Act indicates plainly enough
that Congress did not fail to choose apt language to express its pur-
pose. Moreover, the Supreme Court has said in the Western Meat
Company Case, supra, that "The purpose of the Act was to prevent
continued holding of stock and the peculiar evils incident thereto." And
the four members of the Court who dissented had no doubt that this
was the specific holding of the Court.
But what of the reference to a remedy under Section 15 of the
Clayton Act?
The argument that this citation of Section 15 means that the
United States may compel the return of assets after the corporation
whose stock is acquired has been dissolved and therefore after all
ownership of stock has ceased comes to this: The district courts have
been given jurisdiction under Section 1 5 of the Clayton Act to require
the return of assets although the holding of these assets does not
violate the purpose of the Act. Of course no court will enforce an
act contrary to its purpose and beyond its wording. No court may
properly retain jurisdiction unless that jurisdiction is founded on
some violation of law. The only alternative argument is that the
Supreme Court used the above language, descriptive of the purpose of
Section 7, loosely, that the Court did not mean what it plainly said,
and that the Justices who dissented were in error when they ascribed
the meaning to the opinion which its words had clearly expressed.
*While it is therefore believed that Section 7 does-not condemn such
a holding of assets it is nevertheless felt that the language of the
Supreme Court and particularly the reference to Scetion is, leaves
the answer in substantial doubt.
Less troublesome is the question presented when corporation A
acquires the assets of its competitor, corporation B, and pays for
those assets with its own stock.
21SEN. REp. No. 698, 63d Cong. 2d Sess., July 22, 1914. Italics supplied.22Standard Co. v. Magrane& Houston, 258 U. S. 346,356, 42 Sup. Ct. 360 (1922).
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The committee reports submitted to Congress contain no sugges-
tion that this situation was contemplated by Section 7. There was at
least one specific statement made during the Senate debates to the
effect that this state of facts did not come within the condemnation
of the law.2 And yet an Attorney General of the United States
recognized the situation presented as a doubtful and a difficult one.24
If, as stated by the Supreme Court, the purpose of Section 7 was
"to prevent continued holding of stock and the peculiar evils incident
nSenator Colt stated: "Now I should like to ask the Senator from Missouri if
the same effect, so far as the elimination of competition is concerned would not
be accomplished if Corporation B was wound up and Corporation A bought the
property and paid for it in stock of the company? I cannot quite understand
the reasons upon which this provision is founded if its purpose is to prevent the
suppression of competition."
Senator Reed replied:
"It is no answer either to say that the corporation might sell all of its assets to
another corporation, or that a corporation might go out of business and its prop-
erty might be acquired by another corporation. When that is done, it means an
increase of capital stock. It means that there is given to the world knowledge of
the fact that the property of the business are thus controlled; whereas, under
the method of stock ownership that has been exercised in this country for years a
secret control and frequently monopoly is almost completelyworked outthrough it."
These remarks were made relative to an amendment proposed by Senator
Reed which provided:
"That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire directly or indirectly
the whole or any part of the stock or other shared capital of other corporations
engaged also in commerce in the same line or lines of business." 51 CONG. REC.
14456-14457 (1914).
2AIn considering certain steel mergers Attorney General Daugherty found
that the mergers would not substantially lessen competition.
"This conclusion renders it unnecessary for me to consider another question,
the solution of which is attended with no little difficulty, and that is whether
the proposed merger would fall within this Act if its effect were to substantially
lessen competition. As we have just seen, that Act does not in express terms
prohibit the acquisition of physical assets. What it prohibits is the acquisition
of "the stock or other share capital." What the Bethlehem Co. in this instance
proposes to do is to acquire, not the capital stock of the Lackawanna, but an
outright conveyance of its physical assets. The Federal Trade Commission, by a
ruling made in 1916, announced that in its opinion the Act did not prohibit the ac-
quisition of the physical assets of one corporation by another. As that body,
no less than myself, is charged with the duty of enforcing certain provisions of
this Act, its administrative construction of the section in question is entitled,
under a long and well-recognized line of authorities, to great weight. In this
instance, however, the plan of purchase contemplates that the Lackawanna
shall convey its property to the Bethlehem in return for shares of stock of the
latter company, to be followed by an early winding up and dissolution of the
Lackawanna and the distribution of these shares among the Lackawanna stock-
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thereto" it is clear that an acquisition of assets is not condemned
even though the assets are paid for in stock. The evil, which is the
elimination of competition, may be incident to the acquisition of
assets, but it is only indirectly the result of the holding of stock.
Also, even if the purpose of the Section be as stated by a minority
of the Court to "prevent the peculiar evils resulting" from the holding
of stock such an acquis;tion of assets would seem not to be condemned.
The loss of competition could be only remotely charged to any hold-
ing of stock and it therefore seems that this situation should on prin-
ciple be judged as any other acquisition of assets would be and that
the answer should not be influenced by the fact that the acquiring
corporation chose to pay for the assets in stock and not in cash.
But here also there is the fundamental conflict of opinion as to the
purpose of Section 7.
These uncertainties suggested by the Western Meat Company Case
supra, raise important questions of public policy. Is there need for an
interpretation of Section 7 which will make that Section applicable
to certain acquisitions of assets? Is there need for additional legisla-
tion?
It is true that under existing law, particularly the law announced
in United States v. United States Steel Corporation,25 the dominance
obtained by a corporation in any line of commerce must be very
great before a court will infer an intent to monopolize from a mere
acquisition of assets. But if a more strenuous law be needed, if
certain mergers not now reached by the Clayton Act or the Sherman
Law must be prevented in their incipiency, it is submitted that the
solution does not lie in condemning acquisitions of assets which
result merely in lessening competition between the corporations
involved. The opinion is hazarded that the public welfare does not
call for the prevention of all mergers of two or more corporations,
more or less competing, where the effect is limited to the elimination
of competition existing among them and where the resulting effect
is not substantially to lessen competition in the country at large or in
any given section or does not tend to create a monopoly in the com-
merce involved. If supplemental legislation is needed to reach
consolidations in their incipiency, it might better be confined to
condemning acquisitions of assets and stocks resulting in the sub-
stantial lessening of competition or which tend to create monopoly in
any line of commerce in the country at large or in any section thereof.
holders. I need not, however, stop to consider whether, under other circum-
stances, this would be a violation of the Act, for the conclusion I have just an-
nounced makes it unnecessary to do so." 33 OPINioNs OF ATnoRNEys GENERAL
241--242(1922). 25 1 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293 (1920).
